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EMAAR MGF LAND LTD. v. AFTAB
SINGH: THE END OF THE LINE FOR
CONSUMER ARBITRATION IN INDIA
—Ajar Rab*

Abstract The recent decision of the Supreme Court uphold-

ing the judgment of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission in Aftab Singh v. Emaar Mgf Land Ltd. finally
clears the confusion over arbitration of consumer disputes.
While jurisprudence prior to the NCDRC’s decision left the
choice to the consumer to seek redressal before the forums
established under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, or to
seek redressal through arbitration, it was for the first time that
a judicial body had entered the murky waters of whether consumer disputes are arbitrable or not. NCDRC’s decision marked
a watershed in jurisprudence on consumer arbitration in India
and ultimately held consumer disputes unarbitrable under
Section 2(3) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. This
paper takes a critical look at the decisions on consumer arbitration prior to the decision of the NCDRC, the decision in
Emaar, and whether consumer disputes should be arbitrable. It
argues that while the NCDRC arrived at the right conclusion,
the analysis should not have been restricted to the Consumer
Protection Act being a special legislation and consumer disputes
being unarbitrable on grounds of public policy. Thus, the paper
argues that the Supreme Court too, in following suit, missed a
golden opportunity to not only examine the issue of arbitrability
but also to consider the inherent nature of consumer disputes,
thereby resulting in the right position of law, but on half-baked
legal reasoning.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The reference of consumer disputes to arbitration or consumer arbitration
as it is sometimes called, has for long been an unpleasant road in Indian
law.1 Judicial precedent has forced consumers to row in two boats, i.e., it has
maintained jurisdiction of both the consumer fora and the arbitral tribunal in
the presence of arbitration clauses and has never completely ousted the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.2
However, the recent decision of the Supreme Court of India (“SC”)3
upholding the judgment of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission (“NCDRC”) in Aftab Singh v. Emaar Mgf Land Ltd.4
(“Emaar”) has finally sunk the boat of arbitration by holding that consumer disputes are unarbitrable under Section 2(3) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) and hence, consumer forums
are not bound to refer consumer disputes to arbitration under Section 8(1)
Arbitration Act.
Admittedly, the decision of the NCDRC and now the SC, marks a
watershed in the development of jurisprudence on the issue of arbitrability of consumer disputes and the jurisdiction of the fora created under the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (“CoPRA”). Section 3 of CoPRA prima
facie states that the remedies under the CoPRA shall be in addition to, and
not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law. Thus, the CoPRA only
provides for additional remedies, and does not oust the possibility of arbitration of consumer disputes. On the other hand, the addition of the words
“notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court or
any Court”5 to Section 8(1) of the Arbitration Act in 20156 arguably manifests the intention of the legislature to disregard any previous judgments,7
1

2

3

4
5

6
7

Alan S. Kaplinsky and Mark J. Levin, ‘Consumer Arbitration: If the FAA “Ain’t Broke”,
Don’t Fix It’, The Business Lawyer, vol. 63, no. 3, May 2008, pp. 907-919.
Skypack Couriers Ltd. v. Tata Chemicals Ltd. [2000] 5 SCC 294; National Seeds Corpn.
Ltd. v. M. Madhusudhan Reddy [2012] 2 SCC 506; and Rosedale Developers (P) Ltd. v.
Aghore Bhattacharya [2018] 11 SCC 337 : [2015] 1 WBLR 385.
Emaar Mgf Land Ltd. v. Aftab Singh, Civil Appeal Nos. 23512-23513 of 2017, decided on
13-2-2018 (SC).
Aftab Singh v. Emaar Mgf Land Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine NCDRC 1614.
Arbitration Act, s8(1) (this provision states as:
“
A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject
of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his
first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration..”)
As amended by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015.
Such as that passed in National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. v. M. Madhusudhan Reddy [2012] 2
SCC 506, Skypack Couriers Ltd. v. Tata Chemicals Ltd. [2000] 5 SCC 294 and Rosedale
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which held that the remedy of arbitration is not the only remedy available
to the consumer, but is an optional remedy. Therefore, the consumer is free
to choose whether the consumer wishes to opt for the remedy under the
CoPRA or seeks to resolve his/her dispute through the remedy of arbitration.
However, the moot question is: What should prevail? Should consumer
forums disregard the consent of the parties and force parties to seek redressal from consumer forums when they have specifically opted for resolution
of their dispute through arbitration, or should they hold the consent of the
parties supreme, and refer consumers to arbitrate disputes under Section 8(1)
of the Arbitration Act?
Part I of this paper surveys the important judicial precedents on whether
the presence of an arbitration clause effectively ousted the jurisdiction of the
consumer fora prior to the judgment in Emaar. Part II takes a look at the
arbitrability of consumer disputes. Part III analyses the judgment in Emaar
and how the reasoning of the NCDRC diverges from the existing jurisprudence to completely oust the possibility of consumer arbitration in India.
Part IV takes a critical look at the inherent nature of consumer disputes
irrespective of the test of arbitrability. It supports the decision of the SC and
NCDRC in Emaar on various grounds other than those considered by the
NCDRC.
II. TO ARBITRATE OR NOT TO ARBITRATE? –
SAILING IN TWO BOATS BEFORE EMAAR

The Indian courts have for long hesitated to make up their mind about
consumer arbitration. Caught between being pro-arbitration, and fulfilling
the social welfare objective of the CoPRA, judicial precedents have been shy
to hold that consumer disputes are unarbitrable. Instead, they have conveniently left it to the choice of the consumer, who by the very dint of being a
‘consumer’ has no idea about litigation options.
In this context, it is to be noted that the preamble to the CoPRA states
that the CoPRA was enacted to provide for better protection of the interests of the consumers and for that purpose establishes authorities for the
settlement of consumer disputes.8 Thus, the CoPRA was enacted as a special social legislation to address the unequal bargaining power of consumers
and to provide swift and efficacious remedy. However, the CoPRA lacked a

8

Developers (P) Ltd. v. Aghore Bhattacharya [2018] 11 SCC 337 : [2015] 1 WBLR 385.
Preamble of the CoPRA.
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non-obstante clause giving it overriding application in supersession to other
laws, unlike the recently enacted Real Estate (Regulation and Development)
Act, 2016 (“REA”).9 Instead, Section 3 of the CoPRA made the remedies
under the CoPRA in addition to other existing remedies. Thus, the courts
decided not to choose one way or another as to which remedy would prevail,
i.e., arbitration or the remedy under the CoPRA.
In their hesitation to decide in favour, or against arbitration of consumer
disputes, the courts until Emaar never examined the question of arbitrability
of consumer disputes under Section 2(3) of the Arbitration Act which clearly
provides that not all matters are capable of being referred to arbitration.10
Instead, they chose to focus their attention on whether the remedy under the
CoPRA is exclusive, or in addition to other remedies.
In order to fully appreciate the ramifications of the present problem, it is
pertinent to examine the jurisprudence with respect to Section 8(1) of the
Arbitration Act prior to its amendment in 2015 vis-à-vis consumer disputes.
In Skypack Couriers Ltd. v. Tata Chemicals Ltd.,11 the Supreme Court held
that the remedy under the CoPRA is in addition to provisions of any other
law and therefore, the existence of the arbitration clause cannot oust the
jurisdiction under the CoPRA. In another case, the Supreme Court considered the preamble of the CoPRA and the statements of objects and reasons
and held that “it is apparent that the main objective of the Act is to provide
for better protection of the interest of the consumer and for that purpose
to provide for better redressal mechanism through which cheaper, easier, expeditious and effective redressal is made available to consumers”.12
Therefore, the remedies under the CoPRA cannot be curtailed in favour of
arbitration.
Similarly, in Fair Air Engineers (P) Ltd. v. N.K. Modi,13 the Supreme
Court took the view that the Parliament was well aware of the Contract Act,
1872 and therefore, while passing the CoPRA wanted the remedy under the
Arbitration Act to be in addition to the remedy under the CoPRA and not to
9

10

11
12
13

REA, s89 (this provision states as:
“
The provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent
therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force.”)
Arbitration Act, s2(3) (this provision states as:
“
This Part shall not affect any other law for the time being in force by virtue of which
certain disputes may not be submitted to arbitration.”)
Skypack Couriers Ltd. v. Tata Chemicals Ltd. [2000] 5 SCC 294.
Thirumurugan Coop. Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha [2004] 1 SCC 305.
Fair Air Engineers (P) Ltd. v. N.K. Modi [1996] 6 SCC 385.
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serve as an ouster of the jurisdiction of consumer fora. The court explained
its view as “The reason is that the Act intends to relieve the consumers of
the cumbersome arbitration proceedings or civil action unless the forums on
their own […] come to the conclusion that the appropriate forum for adjudication of the disputes would be otherwise those given in the Act”.
Thereafter, in National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. v. M. Madhusudhan Reddy
(“National Seeds”),14 the court emphasized on the remedies under the
CoPRA being in addition to the other remedies provided under the law and
held that the consumer may choose either to go to arbitration or consumer
fora.
Thus, prior to Emaar the courts were primarily concerned with the remedies available and not whether consumer disputes themselves were arbitrable
under Section 2(3) of the Arbitration Act or not.
III. ARE CONSUMER DISPUTES ARBITRABLE?

Before the decision in Emaar, courts have applied the jurisprudence on
arbitrability of disputes only on the sidelines. However, in order to evaluate
the rationale of the NCDRC in Emaar, it becomes imperative to examine
the existing tests of arbitrability. One such test is the type of remedy sought
and whether such remedy is one which the arbitral tribunal is empowered to
grant,15 especially in the presence of special legislation or public policy considerations. In this context, the most important question is whether an arbitration clause can undermine statutory protections granted under the CoPRA
for consumer disputes16 and whether consumer disputes ought to be referred
to arbitration. In order to answer the above, it is necessary to look at the
position of law with respect to arbitrability of disputes.17
The landmark judgment on the question of arbitrability is the case of
Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd.,18 (“Booz Allen”)
which categorically held:

14
15
16
17

18

National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. v. M. Madhusudhan Reddy [2012] 2 SCC 506.
Russell on Arbitration 28, 2007 (22nd edn., 2002).
Aftab Singh v. Emaar Mgf Land Ltd. [2017] SCC OnLine NCDRC 1614.
For arbitrability of disputes, see generally Ajar Rab, ‘Redressal Mechanism under the
Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act 2016: Ouster of the Arbitration Tribunal?’,
NUJS Law Review, vol. 10, no. 1, 2017. Available from http://nujslawreview.org/2017/03/26/
redressal-mechanism-under-the-real-estate-regulation-and-development-act-2016-ouster-of-the-arbitration-tribunal/, (accessed 6 February 2018).
Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd. [2011] 5 SCC 532.
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“Adjudication of certain categories of proceedings are reserved
by the legislature exclusively for public fora as a matter of
public policy. Certain other categories of cases, though not
expressly reserved for adjudication by public fora (courts and
tribunals), may by necessary implication stand excluded from
the purview of private fora.”
Thus, the court specifically held that public policy considerations or matters exclusively reserved by the legislature for public forums shall be outside
the purview of the arbitration. One such public policy consideration relevant
to the present analysis is whether parties can contract out of the special legislation in favour of dispute resolution by arbitration and oust the jurisdiction of public courts, tribunals or forums.
Addressing such a concern, in Vimal Kishor Shah v. Jayesh Dinesh
Shah,19 the court held that the claims under the Trusts Act, 1882 are not
arbitrable since the Act exhaustively provides for remedies before the
Principal Civil Court. Interestingly, the court relied on the interpretation
in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke,20 wherein the
issue before the court was whether a civil suit can be barred in the context
of remedies provided under the Industrial Disputes Act. Further, in Natraj
Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios,21 while discussing the inter-play of the
Arbitration Act versus the remedies provided under the Bombay Rents Act,
the Supreme Court held:
“17. …Therefore, public policy requires that parties cannot also
be permitted to contract out of the legislative mandate which
requires certain kind of disputes to be settled by Special Courts
constituted by the Act. It follows that arbitration agreements
between parties whose rights are regulated by the Bombay Rents
Act cannot be recognized by a court of law.”
The Supreme Court clearly emphasized that if special courts have been
constituted under a legislation, especially when such legislation is used to
address a social objective, parties cannot be permitted to contract out of the
legislative mandate which requires that disputes under such legislations be
resolved through redressal mechanisms created under such a legislation.

19
20
21

Vimal Kishor Shah v. Jayesh Dinesh Shah [2016] 8 SCC 788.
Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke [1976] 1 SCC 496.
Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios [1981] 1 SCC 523.

2018

THE END OF THE LINE FOR CONSUMER ARBITRATION IN INDIA

47

Recently, in Ayyasamy,22 which is post the amendment to the Arbitration
Act, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud J. referred to the decisions of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court23 and held that the existence of an arbitration clause will
not be a bar to the consumer forum(s) entertaining a complaint under the
CoPRA. In this case, the court took the test mentioned in Booz Allen a step
further and created a distinction between a public fora and special fora. The
rationale of the court was that the general principle is that a dispute which
is capable of adjudication by an ordinary civil court will also be capable of
being resolved by an arbitration. Therefore, the test of public fora may not
be adequate to oust the jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act. The court
explained that there are classes of dispute which falls within the exclusive
domain of special fora under legislation and where such legislation confers
exclusive jurisdiction to the exclusion of the ordinary civil court, then as a
matter of public policy such dispute would not be capable of resolution by
arbitration. Surprisingly and erroneously, the Supreme Court recently upheld
this reasoning in Himangni Enterprises v. Kamaljeet Singh Ahluwalia24 ,
even when the dispute between the landlord and tenant was not governed by
a special rent legislation.
IV. EMAAR – BRINGING CONSUMER
ARBITRATION TO AN END

Relying on the aforesaid judgments, the NCDRC took the view that the
amendment to the Arbitration Act could not be interpreted in a manner by
which the Parliament intended to undo the jurisprudence under the CoPRA
and reduce it to “useless lumber” or “dead letter”.25 The NCDRC stated that
the purpose of the Law Commission’s report with respect to the amendment
to the Arbitration Act was self-evident, being related to the scope and nature
of permissible pre-arbitral judicial intervention, especially in the context
of the Section 11 of the Arbitration Act.26 The NCDRC held that the Law
Commission while using the phrase “notwithstanding any judgment, order
or decree” did not have the issue of non-arbitrability of consumer disputes

22
23

24
25
26

A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam [2016] 10 SCC 386.
Skypack Couriers Ltd. v. Tata Chemicals Ltd. [2000] 5 SCC 294; National Seeds Corpn.
Ltd. v. M. Madhusudhan Reddy [2012] 2 SCC 506; and Rosedale Developers (P) Ltd. v.
Aghore Bhattacharya [2018] 11 SCC 337 : [2015] 1 WBLR 385.
Himangni Enterprises v. Kamaljeet Singh Ahluwalia [2017] 10 SCC 706.
Aftab Singh v. Emaar Mgf Land Ltd. [2017] SCC OnLine NCDRC 1614, para 31.
Law Commission of India, Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (Law
Com No 246, August 2014).
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or any other dispute in mind. It was limited to changing the position of law
after the judgment in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd.27
The NCRDC also made reference to Section 2(3) of the Arbitration Act
and held that the mandate of the provision was that the statutory regime
concerning the arbitration will not be applicable where public law regime
operates, and unlike many general savings clauses, Section 2(3) of the
Arbitration Act categorically prevents the application of the Arbitration Act
to disputes which are unarbitrable. Therefore, even the Arbitration Act recognizes that there are certain disputes which cannot be referred to arbitration and are to be adjudicated and governed by statutory enactments which
have been specifically passed for a particular public purpose and to attain
the public policy objective. If a tribunal attempts to deal with such matters,
the award so passed would be unenforceable.28
It is extremely important to note that the NCDRC’s reasoning is different
from the existing jurisprudence. In National Seeds,29 the court held that consumers can choose whether to go for arbitration or to seek remedy under the
CoPRA. The NCDRC, in Emaar, expressly held that consumer disputes are
not arbitrable and effectively ousted the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal
by placing reliance on Section 2(3) of the Arbitration Act.
Subsequently, while hearing the appeal against the judgment in Emaar,
the SC in one line held that it does not find any ground for interference with
the order of the NCDRC. The effect of this is that consumers no longer have
a picking-option with respect to the choice of forum for adjudication of their
disputes. By interpreting Section 2(3) of the Arbitration Act and holding
that consumer disputes are no longer arbitrable, irrespective of the choice
of the client, the courts have now closed the future of consumer arbitration
in India. Sadly though, the position of law has emerged on half-baked legal
reasoning and not on the strength of a comprehensive analysis of consumer
arbitration.
V. CONSUMERS SHOULD NOT BE COMPELLED
TO ARBITRATE DISPUTES

While the SC and the NCDRC have ensured that the consumers are no
longer forced to arbitrate their disputes, both courts have missed a golden
27
28
29

SBP & Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd. [2005] 8 SCC 618 : [2005] 3 Arb LR 285.
Aftab Singh v. Emaar Mgf Land Ltd. [2017] SCC OnLine NCDRC 1614.
National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. v. M. Madhusudhan Reddy [2012] 2 SCC 506.
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opportunity to discuss and examine the nature of consumer disputes and
consider whether the traditional rules of the philosophy of arbitration apply
to consumer disputes.
Freedom of Contract - One of the key features and premise of arbitration
is that arbitration is a creature of consent, i.e., the starting point is the contract to arbitrate.30 Parties willingly consent to refer their dispute to a forum
apart from the court. They are usually informed and the decision to arbitrate
is voluntary, i.e., they have the opportunity to determine what disputes are
to be subjected to arbitration, they have the freedom to choose the arbitrator,
the seat of arbitration, the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal and the applicable law.31 Thus, the entire premise of arbitration rests in
the freedom of contract. However, it is this very freedom of contract that is
missing in the agreements and contractual relationship between businesses
and consumers.32
No Explicit Bargain - In consumer disputes, the decision to arbitrate is
almost never the subject of an explicit bargain.33 The parties, especially
the consumers, never get to choose or even negotiate on whether they are
agreeable to settle their disputes through arbitration. The choice to arbitrate
is usually made unilaterally by the drafter of the standard form, who most
likely selected arbitration not for its fairness but for its advantage.34 Thus,
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts do not involve arm’s length negotiation but instead comprise terms which are given to the consumer on a takeit-or-leave-it basis, the classic case of adhesion in contracts.35
Result Shopping – Businesses, thus, impose arbitration to effectively
keep the national courts or the judicial system out of the business of the
consumer protection and replace it with a system of private justice, i.e.,
an effective result shopping and not just forum shopping alone.36 Another

30

31
32
33

34
35

36

Richard E. Speidel, ‘Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute
[Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?’, (1998) 40 Arizona Law Review 1069.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Edward A. Dauer, ‘Judicial Policing of Consumer Arbitration’, (2000) 1 Pepp. Disp. Res.
L.J. 91.
Ibid.
Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Clark Kelso, ‘Protecting Consumers in Arbitration: Consumer
Due Process Protocol Sets Forth 15 Principles for Assuring Consumers a Fundamentally
Fair Dispute Resolution Process’, (1998) 5 Dispute Resolution Magazine 11.
Cherisse Mastry, ‘Arbitration of Consumer Disputes: The AAA’s Consumer Due Process
Protocol’, (2001) 5 Journal of Texas Consumer Law 43.
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reason for businesses to use arbitration clauses as part of their boilerplate
contract is to enact major changes in the substance and application of law.37
Bar to Class Actions - It is abundantly clear that only businesses get to
decide whether their dispute shall be governed by arbitration or not. It is in
the interest of businesses to use arbitration as it excludes class action suits.
Lop-sided - Additionally, a system of private justice such as arbitration
will always favour those who control axes, procedures, and the money.38
Thus, businesses analyze and determine the attributes of arbitration which
will operate solely in their favour, e.g., a private venue chosen by an economically stronger party will effectively serve as a deterrent to the consumer from pursuing his/her claim at a far off venue.39 Thus, though on the
face of it, the arbitration mechanism seems to be fair but it can be systematically lopsided40 in terms of the cost of arbitration, selection of venue, choice
of arbitrators, etc., and therefore, unfair to the consumers.41
Cost of Arbitration - The cost of arbitration is usually high, and in some
cases prohibitively high, either because the consumer may not be in a position to afford the fees of lawyers and the arbitrator’s fees, or because the
cost of bringing a claim would outweigh the benefit of the remedy.42 Since
consumer disputes arise most frequently with respect to small grievances
such as home repairs, sale of cars, purchase of appliances or home furnishings, etc., the goods sold and services rendered are often necessities and not
luxuries.43 Therefore, to include arbitration for such small claims makes little sense, especially in light of the fact that businesses can tailor arbitration
clauses to favour them.
Invalid Waiver - It is settled law that the principle of quilibet potest
renunciare juri pro se introducto, i.e., anyone may renounce a law introduced for his own benefit, is applicable only when the statute makes the
provision for individual benefit and the prohibition is not a matter of public
37
38
39
40
41

42

43

Ibid.
Ibid.
Dauer (n 33).
Dauer (n 33).
Sugandha Kamal, ‘Mandatory Consumer Arbitration’, 3 May 2012. Available from SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2050418, (accessed 6 February 2018).
Mark E. Budnitz, ‘The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration’, Law and
Contemporary Problems, vol. 67, no. 1/2, Mandatory Arbitration, Winter-Spring 2004, p.
133-166.
Aryeh Friedman, ‘The Effectiveness of Arbitration for the Resolution of Consumer
Disputes’, (1977) 6 N.Y.U. Review of Law & Social Change 175.
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policy. However, in cases where the statute has been enacted in the interests of public policy and for the benefit of the public, such a right cannot be
waived under any circumstance.44 Therefore, if it is to be argued that parties
validly gave up the remedy under the CoPRA in favour of arbitration, such
a waiver would be invalid in light of the CoPRA being a statute enacted
in the interest of public policy and hence, its application incapable of being
contracted out of.
Uninformed Consumers – Most often than not, consumers are not aware
of the process of arbitration, the consent to an arbitration clause and its
effect of waiver of the right to go to trial or consumer forum. Furthermore,
consumers have no access to information about arbitration procedure and
their complexity. They often do not understand who should be appointed as
arbitrator and what role that person is supposed to play. Therefore, the consumers’ understanding the questions of independence and impartiality of the
arbitrators does not even arise. Inevitably, parties have to engage lawyers to
help them navigate the unchartered territory of arbitration. Therefore, the
intent of allowing consumers to represent their own cases under the CoPRA
would be rendered futile.45
Non-publication of awards – Since arbitration awards are not available in
public domain, it forces consumers to compulsorily arbitrate disputes raising
public policy concerns. The public is not only interested in resolving independent disputes but is also entrusted with ensuring that publicly promulgated laws are enforced and publicized.46 Also, it is in the interest of the
State to regulate consumer affairs in order to protect consumers. Otherwise,
the objective of better protection of consumers mentioned in the preamble
of the CoPRA would be negated as the State will not have any information on the violations of the CoPRA and hence, will not be able to regulate
consumer affairs or enact or amend existing legislation in light of new consumer concerns.
Lack of Binding Precedent – Another problem that comes with forcing
consumers to arbitrate their disputes is that the arbitrators cannot create or

44

45
46

Murlidhar Aggarwal v. State of U.P. [1974] 2 SCC 472 : [1975] 1 SCR 575 – the tenant
waived his right to approach the civil court under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rents
and Eviction Act. The lease deed was declared illegal as the provision was for the benefit
of the public and could not be waived; Indira Bai v. Nand Kishore [1990] 4 SCC 668.
Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005, s26 (3) and s 26(4).
Kamal (n 41).
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modify existing law.47 Thus, arbitrators would not be able to further develop
jurisprudence on consumer rights and concepts such as deficiency of service, strict product liability, definition of consumer, etc., would become
stagnant and arbitrators will simply continue to apply existing principles of
law even though nature of dispute may demand new tests, approaches and
jurisprudence.
Consumers Cannot Choose the Right Arbitrators – Consumers might
choose people who they know. Such people may not necessarily be lawyers
or judges. Thus, there is ample scope for the possibility that there might be
procedural unfairness or divergence from rules of evidence, etc., which may
not be sufficient for a successful challenge of the award under Section 34 of
the Arbitration Act since the grounds for challenge are limited.48
CoPRA Will Become Futile – If parties are forced to arbitrate their consumer disputes, the entire purpose of the CoPRA would be frustrated. The
Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hindustan Safety Glass
Works Ltd.,49 categorically highlighted that the CoPRA was enacted by
the Parliament as the beneficial legislation to overcome the disadvantage a
consumer has vis-à-vis the supplier of goods and services. In several cases,50 the court has held that the provisions of the CoPRA have to be interpreted in favour of the consumer in order to equalize the bargaining power
of consumers. Furthermore, on several occasions, the court has held that
the CoPRA should be interpreted in a liberal manner and such interpretation should be preferred which fulfills the purpose of the Act. Thus, forcing
consumers to arbitrate would effectively undo the CoPRA and the existing
jurisprudence.
VI. CONCLUSION

It is clear from the foregoing that Emaar marks the first judicial precedent which engages in the real examination of the question of arbitrability of
consumer disputes. However, the NCDRC came to the right conclusion only
on the basis that consumers cannot be forced to arbitrate in light of CoPRA
being a special legislation and on grounds of public policy. The Supreme
47

48
49
50

Richard M. Alderman, ‘What’s Really Wrong with Forced Consumer Arbitration?’,
Business Law Today, November 2010, paras 1-2.
Justice R.S. Bachawat’s Law of Arbitration & Conciliation, vol. 1, 6th edn., 2018, p. 1795.
National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Hindustan Safety Glass Works Ltd. [2017] 5 SCC 776.
LDA v. M.K. Gupta [1994] 1 SCC 243 : AIR [1994] SC 787, relying on ESI Corpn. v. High
Land Coffee Works [1991] 3 SCC 617; CIT v. Taj Mahal Hotel [1971] 3 SCC 550 and State
of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha AIR [1960] SC 610.
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Court has now followed suit. While hearing the appeal, it should have at
least examined the long-standing confusion over consumer arbitration after
analyzing the entire philosophy of consumer disputes. Instead, the judges
chose to shy away from that onerous, yet necessary task, by simply opting
to not interfere with the NCDRC’s judgment in Emaar, without any reasons.
Despite the broad and encompassing language of Section 3 of the
CoPRA, the Supreme Court should have ventured into the inherent problems
with consumer arbitration and not just rely on the existing jurisprudence on
arbitrability which was examined by the NCDRC. In this context, the court
would have found ample support from various jurisdictions across the globe
which have specifically amended or enacted law(s) explicitly excluding consumer disputes from arbitration.51
Thus, while the road for consumer arbitration in India now remains
forever closed, it is sadly not the result of a deliberate and conscious step
towards protecting consumer rights but as a result of a landslide of the jurisprudence of arbitrability of disputes barricading consumer arbitration.
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